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ABSTRACT 
The right to privacy explicitly provided by the Alaska Constitution has long 
been broadly interpreted—even protecting Alaskan citizens’ right to personal 
home use and possession of marijuana. Though this right to privacy has been 
interpreted many times over the last few decades, Alaska currently lacks a 
coherent approach to application of its privacy laws. As the prevalence of 
methamphetamine production increases in homes across Alaska, the Alaskan 
courts’ approach to privacy must be reevaluated in light of its delicate 
interaction with search and seizure policies surrounding methamphetamine 
labs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the citizens of Alaska, with their strong emphasis on individual 
liberty, enacted an amendment to the Alaska Constitution expressly 
providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States 
Constitution, it can only be concluded that the right is broader in 
scope than that of the Federal Constitution.1 
 
This Note proposes that Alaskan courts should adopt a coherent, 
purposeful approach to balancing Alaskans’ codified right to privacy 
with the state’s interest in protecting its people. The key case examined 
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 1.  Anchorage Police Dep’t Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 
P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001). 
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here is Martin v. State.2 While exemplifying many aspects of Alaska’s 
current approach to a citizen’s right to privacy, the case also provides a 
framework within which competing approaches can be analyzed. This 
Note is divided into four sections. Section I outlines the right to privacy 
as provided in Alaska’s constitution and as interpreted by Alaskan case 
law. Section II examines the extent of the state’s significant interest in 
public health and safety, particularly the interests at stake in Martin. 
Section III analyzes the reasoning and current approaches to privacy law 
in Alaska, as well as how the existence of multiple approaches has 
manifested in Martin. Finally, Section IV highlights how other states 
have balanced the competing interests between privacy and promoting 
public safety. From these considerations, this Note will explain why 
Alaska’s current approach to balancing privacy and public safety 
interest (as exemplified in Martin) is incoherent and suggest a few ways 
in which Alaska’s courts could improve their approach going forward. 
Unreasonable search and seizure laws cut to the core of the intricate 
balance between a citizen’s right to privacy and the government’s duty 
to protect its people. In March 2013, the Court of Appeals of Alaska 
decided the latest in a series of cases on searches conducted in private 
residences without a warrant or invitation. Martin v. State involved a 
search by State Trooper Mike Ingram that resulted in the arrest of Gene 
Martin and four others in their place of residence.3 Martin was tried and 
subsequently convicted of second-degree misconduct involving a 
controlled substance (specifically, the drugstore materials needed to 
make methamphetamine).4 A security guard at a Wasilla shopping 
center tipped off Trooper Ingram that Martin and four others “were 
interested” in items often used to manufacture methamphetamine.5 
Trooper Ingram followed the men from the shopping center to the 
address in question—an apartment complex with five separate 
residences connected by a walkway.6 To avoid detection by the men, 
Trooper Ingram passed the residence before seeing which of the five 
residences the men entered upon stopping at the apartment complex.7 
After calling for back-up and waiting for about two hours in hopes that 
some of the suspects would come out of whichever residence they had 
previously entered, Trooper Ingram proceeded to walk onto a deck 
surrounding the residences and “looked through the window of the first 
 
 2.  297 P.3d 896 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 280 (2014). 
 3.  Id. at 898. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 897. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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unit he came to.”8 Specifically, the officer was looking “through a crack 
in the closed blinds” that was “an opening created by a broken piece of 
blind.”9 It was then that Trooper Ingram saw items commonly used to 
make methamphetamine within the home, and subsequently obtained a 
search warrant based on what he saw through the blinds.10 
The finding that Trooper Ingram was standing on a walkway that 
was “impliedly open to the public” at the time of the search,11 a 
technicality, stopped the Alaskan court from declaring a much-needed 
comprehensive approach to search and seizure jurisprudence in Alaska. 
In Martin, the Alaska Court of Appeals analyzed Trooper Ingram’s 
search in two parts: (1) the approach of the trooper towards the window 
and (2) the trooper’s looking through a broken piece in the closed 
blinds.12 The court made a determination on the first part of the analysis, 
and therefore did not reach the issue of whether the officer was 
reasonable in looking through a crack in the closed blinds.13 By declaring 
the walkway to be impliedly open to the public and stopping at the first 
step of analysis,  the court declined the opportunity to choose one of the 
many approaches currently employed by the court, further 
demonstrating the need to create a comprehensive approach to 
balancing a right to privacy with the state’s interest in public safety. 
According to Alaska law, without either a search warrant or an 
invitation, law enforcement may only approach a residence if they are 
“standing upon a part of [the] property that has been expressly or 
impliedly opened to the public use.”14 Relying on this rule in Martin, the 
appellate court affirmed the superior court’s finding that the deck was 
impliedly open to the public when Trooper Ingram approached the 
window to look inside.15 The reasons given by the superior court for 
their finding had included the facts that Trooper Ingram “was not 
engaged in some random fishing expedition,” and that he “reasonably 
suspected” the group of men he had followed to be engaged in illegal 
activity.16 Still, these reasons parallel the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test that would have been employed in step two of the analysis. 
Thus, under Martin, an Alaskan citizen—who may otherwise have had a 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 897–98. 
 11.  Id. at 898. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See id. at 899–900 (explaining that because the court held that Trooper 
Ingram’s vantage point was found to be “impliedly open to the public[,]” the 
court could find that the officer’s looking through the blinds was lawful). 
 14.  Pistro v. State, 590 P.2d 884, 886 (Alaska 1979). 
 15.  Martin, 297 P.3d at 899. 
 16.  Id. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy—may never have had that expectation 
if the officer who infringes that expectation is deemed, in an ad hoc 
determination by an Alaska court, to have reasonably suspected the 
citizen of being engaged in illegal activity. Indeed, the situation in which 
an officer suspects illegal activity may be the only time a reasonable 
expectation of privacy would be at issue in the first place. But because 
Trooper Ingram was standing on an impliedly public walkway, the 
officer’s observation of chemicals through a crack in the drawn window 
blinds was allowed to serve as the primary evidence in a showing of 
probable cause used to subsequently obtain a search warrant for the 
residence.17 
The bifurcated analysis and novel result in Martin exemplify the 
need for a comprehensive approach to the right to privacy throughout 
the Alaskan court system. Situations like the one presented in Martin 
will continue to arise. Accordingly, Alaska needs to adopt an approach 
to reasonable searches that incorporates both the right to privacy 
guaranteed by its state constitution and the growing need to protect its 
people from the dangers of drug manufacturing. 
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.18 
Affectionately referring to the rest of the United States as the ‘lower 
forty-eight,’ Alaska has embraced its unique heritage since gaining 
statehood.19 One of the many unique qualities of the Alaska government 
comes in the form of the express right to privacy guaranteed by the 
state’s constitution. Only ten states, including Alaska, expressly provide 
for a right to privacy in their state constitution.20 Since Ravin v. State21 in 
 
 17.  Id. at 897. 
 18.  ALASKA CONST. art. 12, § 22. 
 19.  Gaining statehood on January 3, 1959, Alaska is the most recent state to 
be admitted to the United States apart from Hawaii (which gained statehood in 
August of the same year). Alaska Statehood Act of 1959, Pub.L. 85-508, 72 Stat. 
339, 339; Hawaii Statehood Admission Act of 1959, Pub.L. 86-3. See also Consent 
to Act of Admission, ALASKA CONST. art. 12, § 13. 
 20.  Other states that reiterate the Fourth Amendment, as well as expand 
upon the general right to privacy, include Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. Privacy 
Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 12, 
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx. 
 21.  537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). In Ravin v. State, the Alaska Supreme 
Court held that the general right to privacy in article I, section 22 allowed for 
personal possession and use of marijuana in the home. Id. 
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1975, Alaska courts have created a robust jurisprudence surrounding the 
right to privacy. These official expansions of the general right to privacy 
echo the strong social mores of the Alaskan people—a long-existing 
consensus that Alaskans want to be left alone in their independent 
lifestyles by the government’s influence.22 As recognized by the Alaska 
Supreme Court, “[o]ur territory and now state has traditionally been the 
home of people who prize their individuality and who have chosen to 
settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a measure of control 
over their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of 
our sister states.”23 
“[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general right 
to privacy.”24 Instead, the issue of whether or not each citizen has a right 
to privacy has been “left largely to the law of the individual [s]tates.”25 
Alaska has addressed this issue directly by setting out a right to privacy 
in its state constitution. Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution expressly 
recognizes a “right of the people to privacy” that “shall not be 
infringed.”26 Signaling the importance of this right, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has since determined that the right to privacy is self-executing.27 
The Alaska Constitution also provides that “all persons have a natural 
right to life, liberty, [and] the pursuit of happiness.”28 In 1972, the same 
year that Alaska’s Declaration of Rights was signed into law, the Alaska 
Supreme Court held that the word “liberty” in article I, section 1 
provided “total personal immunity from governmental control: the right 
‘to be let alone.’”29 Even in the context of searches and seizures, the 
Fourth Amendment and its interpretations do not limit the scope of this 
right to privacy in the state of Alaska.30 Indeed, the Alaska 
Constitution’s privacy provisions have continually been interpreted to 
encompass a broader right to privacy than the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. The Alaska Constitution’s right to 
privacy was first interpreted as broader than the Fourth Amendment in 
1975 by Ravin, and its expansive guarantee has been reiterated as 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
 25.  Id. at 351. 
 26.  ALASKA  CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 27.  State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 37–38 (Alaska 2001). 
 28.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 29.  Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972). 
 30.  See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874–75 (Alaska 1978) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment and any federal decisions “should not be regarded as 
determinative of the scope of Alaska’s right to privacy amendment, since no 
such express right is contained in the United States Constitution”). 
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recently as 2000.31 
Not only does the right to privacy extend beyond the protection 
from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, 
but the express guarantee of privacy in article I, section 22 of the Alaska 
Constitution has also been interpreted to be a “fundamental individual 
right” by the Alaska Supreme Court.32 Originating as Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 68, the right to privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution 
was amended in the Senate and moved on to the House in June of 
1972.33 Legislative revisions have provided powerful insight into the 
interpretation of the legislative intent.34 For instance, the commentary of 
the legislators has been found to support an extension of the right to 
privacy beyond just informational privacy.35 The right to privacy 
provisions have even supported the right of the mentally ill to refuse 
antipsychotic medication in non-emergency situations.36 One of the 
primary functions of the right to privacy guaranteed in the Alaska 
Constitution, however, is specifically the protection against government 
intrusion.37 The provisions cover searches by state actors, like police 
officers and detectives.38 Another source of a right to privacy in the 
Alaska Constitution comes in the form of article I, section 14, which 
provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
 
 31.  See State v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 379 
(Alaska 2009) (striking down a one ounce limit on the possession of marijuana in 
the home under the privacy ruling in Ravin v. State); Anchorage Police Dep’t 
Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001) 
(reiterating the heightened privacy interests in Alaska as compared to the 
federal floor). 
 32.  Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 36–38. 
 33.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 7th Leg., 1st Sess. 1150, 1173 (June 6–7, 1972); 
ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 7th Leg., 1st Sess. 1478–79 (June 5, 1972). 
 34.  See Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d at 36–38 (looking to the legislative history 
of article I, section 22 in support of the self-executing nature of the right to 
privacy in the Alaska Constitution). 
 35.  Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 n.10 
(Alaska 1997). 
 36.  See Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 254 (Alaska 2006) 
(relying on the “Alaska Constitution’s guarantees of liberty and privacy” to hold 
that “in future non-emergency cases a court may not permit a treatment facility 
to administer psychotropic drugs” without consent or proof by “clear and 
convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is in the patient’s best 
interests”). 
 37.  See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Alaska 
1989) (declining to extend the right to privacy to private actions). 
 38.  See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881–82 (Alaska 1978) (affirming the 
correct application of article I, section 22 in suppression of testimony acquired 
through electronic monitoring because “Alaska’s Constitution mandates that its 
people be free from invasions of privacy by means of surreptitious monitoring of 
conversations”). 
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houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”39 The Alaska Supreme 
Court has further provided that “[t]he primary purpose of these 
constitutional provisions is the protection of personal privacy and 
dignity against unwarranted intrusions by the State.”40 
The right to privacy guaranteed in the Alaska Constitution has 
been uniquely applied in the context of drug possession. In 1975, Alaska 
became the first state to enact a statute declaring that a ban on the 
possession and personal use of marijuana was unconstitutional based on 
the statute’s impermissible infringement on the citizens’ right to 
privacy.41 The court held that the right to privacy guaranteed under 
article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution “encompass[es] the 
possession and ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely 
personal, non-commercial context in the home.”42 
The right to privacy in Alaska, as in the federal jurisdiction, has 
been especially recognized in the home. The express right to privacy in 
article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution was added with the 
deliberate purpose of codifying the concentration of privacy in the home 
of each Alaska resident.43 The fact that Trooper Ingram’s search 
uncovered conduct within the home makes the failure to apply the right 
to privacy in Martin especially troubling. The Alaska Supreme Court 
“has consistently recognized that the home is constitutionally protected 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, reasoning that the home itself 
retains a protected status under the Fourth Amendment and Alaska’s 
constitution distinct from that of the occupant’s person.”44 However, 
part of the court’s reasoning in Ravin turned on the fact that the state 
could not show “any harm to the user or others from the private, 
personal use of marijuana.”45 Where the production or use of 
methamphetamines is the conduct in question, the government will 
 
 39.  See Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 148 
(Alaska 1977) (quoting Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502, 506 (Alaska 1967)) (referring 
to article I, section 14’s guarantees against unreasonable search and seizures by 
the state). 
 40.  Weltz, 431 P.2d at 506 (internal quotations omitted). 
 41.  See Bruce Brashear, Marijuana Prohibition and the Constitutional Right of 
Privacy: An Examination of Ravin v. State, 11 TULSA L. J. 563, 565 (1975) 
(explaining that before the Alaska Supreme Court decided Ravin, “no court had 
declared a statute outlawing the possession and use of marijuana 
unconstitutional” based on a right to privacy). 
 42.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). 
 43.  See id. at 503–04 (“The privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution 
was intended to give recognition and protection to the home.”). 
 44.  Id. at 503. 
 45.  Id. at 501. 
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presumably have an easier time establishing harm to the user and 
others.46 The court in Ravin was careful to add that “[n]o one has an 
absolute right to do things in the privacy of his own home which will 
affect himself or others adversely.”47 However, the government “cannot 
simply decide what is in a person’s best interest and compel it.”48 The 
right to privacy is definitely present to some extent in the home, but 
whether or not the public interest served in Martin should outweigh that 
privacy interest is an issue that needs to be addressed directly. 
In sum, the express right to privacy guaranteed by the Alaska 
Constitution in article I, sections 14 and 22 has been interpreted to 
“serv[e] its core purpose as a ‘restraining force against the abuse of 
governmental power.’”49 This express right to privacy has infamously 
pioneered a right to the possession and personal use of recreational 
drugs in the home.50 If the state’s search of the suspects’ home in Martin 
can be defended as an exception to this robust right to privacy, the state 
will have to provide compelling evidence that it “can meet its 
substantial burden” in showing that its actions were in furtherance of a 
legitimate state interest.51 
II. THE STATE’S INTEREST 
The state has long been empowered to enforce regulations in the 
interest of public safety.52 In direct opposition to the strong right to 
privacy established in Section I, the state of Alaska also faces a growing 
threat to public safety from methamphetamine consumption and 
production. The state’s interest in curtailing this conduct, which often 
takes place in the privacy of individual residences, is an equally  
important factor in Alaska’s establishment of an appropriate approach 
to the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures by the state. It 
is unclear whether heavy emphasis on the Alaska Constitution’s right to 
privacy should prevail over narcotic use now, as it did over marijuana 
use in 1975.53 
First of all, this is a recent problem. Therefore, Alaska Supreme 
 
 46.  See infra Section II. 
 47.  537 P.2d at 504. 
 48.  Id. at 509. 
 49.  State v. Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d 30, 38 n.50 (Alaska 2001) (quoting 
United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Alaska 1967)). 
 50.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2681 (2011) (holding that 
the state’s legitimate interest in promoting public health “falls within the 
traditional scope of a State’s police power”). 
 53.  Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504. 
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Court precedent on personal drug possession and use within the home 
is developing. The prevalence of narcotic manufacturing as well as 
abuse has increased dramatically in recent years nationwide.54 
Specifically, thirty-six methamphetamine labs have been seized in 
Alaska in the last five years alone.55 In addition to the potential for 
bodily harm, manufacturing operations damage property, often beyond 
repair.56 Drug use is also a concern for public safety as it may facilitate 
further crimes by citizens who are under the influence. According to the 
Alaska Department of Public Safety, between thirty-seven and forty-
seven percent of all cases initiated by Alaska State Troopers involved 
either drugs or alcohol.57 Alaska currently deploys seven investigative 
task forces specifically to deal with the state’s drug problem.58 
The fact that the state’s compelling interest in identifying and 
curtailing drug abuse and manufacture was driving the analysis of the 
Martin case bears on how the right to privacy might be limited in that 
context. In the context of drug abuse prevention, the right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizures has been interpreted narrowly 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. For instance, in Board of 
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomi County v. 
Earls, the Supreme Court held that random drug testing of students that 
 
 54.  See 2013 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, U.S., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. 10 (Nov. 2013) http://www.dea.gov/resource-
center/DIR-017-13%20NDTA%20Summary%20final.pdf (stating that as 
methamphetamine prices have decreased nationwide 70 percent from 2007 to 
2012, the purity of the drug has also increased almost 130 percent). This project 
was taken over by the Department of Justice in 2012. Id. at iii. The 2013 National 
Drug Threat Assessment factors were provided by 1,307 state and local law 
enforcement agencies through the 2013 National Drug Threat Survey. Id. at iv. 
 55.  Alaska State Troopers, 2013 Annual Drug Report, ALASKA BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION STATEWIDE DRUG ENF’T UNIT 21 http://www.dps.state.ak.us/ 
AST/ABI/docs/SDEUreports/2013%20Annual%20Drug%20Report.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
 56.  ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVIRON. CONSERVATION, Illegal Drug Manufacturing 
Sites, http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/methlab/methlab_listing.htm (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2014) (listing illegal drug manufacturing site records kept by 
Department of Environmental Conservation as required by 46.03.550(b) of the 
Alaska Statutes). 
 57.  Div. Statewide Drug Enf’t Unit, DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
http://dps.alaska.gov/AST/ABI/SDEU.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
 58.  Alaska State Troopers, 2013 Annual Drug Report, ALASKA BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION STATEWIDE DRUG ENF’T UNIT 4 http://www.dps.state.ak.us/AST/ 
ABI/docs/SDEUreports/2013%20Annual%20Drug%20Report.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2015). The seven task forces are the Alaska Interdiction Task 
Force/Anchorage Enforcement Group (DEA sponsored), Fairbanks Area-wide 
Narcotics Team, Mat-Su Narcotics Enforcement Team, South Central Area-wide 
Narcotics Team, Southeast Alaska Cities Against Drugs Task Force, Western 
Alaska Alcohol and Narcotics Team, Special Crimes Investigation Unit. 
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participated in extracurricular activities, even without suspicion, did not 
violate the students’ Fourth Amendment rights.59 Despite the express 
right to privacy found in the Alaska Constitution, the Court’s holding in 
Earls echoed the stance already taken in the year prior by the Alaska 
Supreme Court.60 As noted in Section I, the state of Alaska has a unique 
history in its treatment of drug use and the right to privacy.61 Arguably, 
Alaska’s more liberal view of personal drug use is due in part to the 
Alaska Supreme Court’s view on what constitutes a state’s interest in 
preventing harm to its citizens. After analyzing several approaches, the 
court in Ravin affirmed a “general proposition that the authority of the 
state to exert control over the individual extends only to activities of the 
individual which affect others or the public at large.”62 Although the 
right to privacy and freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle is not 
absolute, the court only allows the right to be curtailed where “it begins 
to infringe on the rights and welfare of others.”63 
Because of the tenets embraced by the Alaska Supreme Court, the 
main analysis of public safety and its balance with a citizen’s right to 
privacy focuses on the harm done to others in the society. In allowing 
the right to privacy to cover personal use of marijuana in the home, the 
Alaska Supreme Court emphasized marijuana’s effects of “passivity and 
inactivity” on the mind and body.64 This allowed the court to discount 
the public harm that might be caused by getting high and driving—a 
phenomenon seen as the most common way marijuana use could harm 
others.65 In contrast to marijuana’s mellowing effects, 
methamphetamines often produce physical effects like “increased 
wakefulness, increased physical activity . . . increased respiration, [and] 
rapid heart rate” while at the same time producing “reduced motor 
skills” and “anxiety, confusion, insomnia, and mood disturbances” as 
well as “violent behavior.”66 Therefore, the evidence cited in Ravin, 
making the harm caused by marijuana seem less likely to affect people 
 
 59.  See 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (“A student’s privacy interest is limited in a 
public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining 
discipline, health, and safety.”). 
 60.  See Alaska Police Dep’t Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 
P.3d 547, 557 (Alaska 2001) (approving suspicionless drug testing for some 
police officers and firefighters). 
 61.  See supra Section I. 
 62.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 509 (Alaska 1975). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 510–11. 
 65.  Id. at 511. 
 66.  DrugFacts: Methamphetamine, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 1–2 (Jan. 2014), https:// 
d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/drugfacts_meth.pdf. 
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other than the user himself, is unavailing in the context of 
methamphetamines. 
Another aspect of drug use absent with marijuana in Ravin, but 
present with methamphetamines in Martin, is the commercial use of 
methamphetamine precursors. The Alaska Supreme Court made it very 
clear that the right to privacy only encompassed the possession and use 
“in a purely personal, non-commercial context in the home.”67 The court 
makes a comparison between its treatment of marijuana use and the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of obscenity in the home.68 The “distinction 
between commercial distribution of obscene matter and the private 
enjoyment of it at home” was incorporated into the right to privacy 
analysis of the use of illicit substances in the home.69 The fact that the 
suspects in Martin were suspected of buying the materials necessary for 
the manufacture of methamphetamines, presumably commercial rather 
than merely personal use of the drugs, cuts against the right to privacy 
from Trooper Ingram’s search in the Martin case. 
Despite the dangers and societal costs of methamphetamine use, 
the state’s interest in public safety must still be balanced with the 
express right to privacy in Alaska. After all, the court did not make its 
ruling in Ravin in absence of serious doubts about the safety of 
marijuana. The Alaska Supreme Court emphasized that the ruling did 
“not mean to condone the use of marijuana.”70 Instead, the court found 
that the right to privacy in Alaska’s Constitution outweighed the 
opinion of the experts involved that were “unanimously opposed to the 
use of any psychoactive drugs.”71 This makes it less clear that the danger 
of methamphetamine to users is enough to outweigh the privacy 
concerns raised by the search in Martin. However, even in 1975, the 
court noted the increased danger of other drugs that “result in numbers 
of people becoming public charges” or “widespread use of [a] drug 
[that] could significantly debilitate the fabric of our society” as possibly 
necessitating state interference in the future.72 
 
 67.  Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504. 
 68.  See id. at 499 (discussing the Supreme Court’s development and 
refinement of case law on First and Fourteenth Amendment protections 
applicable to obscene materials). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 511. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 509–10 (comparing marijuana use with “far more dangerous effects 
of alcohol, barbiturates, and amphetamines”). 
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III. CURRENT APPROACHES 
The Martin case embodies the collision of two strong legal 
footholds. On one hand, the state has a strong, clear interest in 
protecting its citizens and societal fabric from methamphetamine use 
and manufacture. On the other hand, each citizen has a right to privacy 
expressly provided for in the Alaska Constitution—a right that is most 
acute in the home. 
Despite the right to privacy’s classification as a fundamental right, 
the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized some limitations on the right 
due to public policy considerations. In Ravin, the court cautioned that 
even within the home, “the right of privacy in the sense of immunity 
from prosecution is absolute only when the private activity will not 
endanger or harm the general public.”73 However, as the majority held in 
Ravin, the right to privacy does “encompass the possession and 
ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely personal, non-
commercial context in the home.”74 In Alaska, the government can only 
prosecute these types of activities in the home if “the state can meet its 
substantial burden” by showing that the prevention or regulation of the 
activity in question achieves “a legitimate state interest.”75 In Martin, the 
court failed to establish the legitimate state interest that supports waiver 
of the privacy considerations traditionally given to activities (even drug 
related activities) within the home. Though, as stated in Section II of this 
Note, the state may have a substantially more legitimate state interest in 
regulating the home manufacture of methamphetamine than personal 
marijuana use,76 the Martin decision makes no argument on these 
grounds. Instead, the court relies solely on the implied openness to the 
public of the walkway upon which Trooper Ingram stood. 
By deciding Martin on the basis of whether the walkway upon 
which Trooper Ingram stood was open to the public, the court robbed 
itself of an opportunity to face the balancing issue head on. This 
theoretical punt of addressing two competing interests in Martin, 
privacy and public safety, is the latest example of the current scattered 
approach to privacy law in Alaska. 
 
 73.  Id. at 500 (emphasis added). 
 74.  Id. at 504. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  This assumes that the state interest would be in the societal effects of 
methamphetamine production and use, rather than a purely paternalistic 
motive. 
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A. Current Theoretical Approaches to the Right to Privacy in Alaska 
Since the court’s interpretation of the express right to privacy in 
Ravin, several different approaches to the right to privacy have emerged, 
cluttering Alaska’s privacy jurisprudence.77 Three separate approaches 
have been identified in Alaska’s privacy law, each applied in different 
fact-specific scenarios. The first two approaches, the “compelling state 
interest” test and the “sliding scale” approach, both require a 
justification based on how closely tailored the state action is to the state 
interest. The third approach, distinct from the first two tailoring 
approaches, is the reasonable expectation test. The Alaska Supreme 
Court has employed all three of these approaches at various times. 
However, Alaska’s privacy jurisprudence would benefit from a more 
consistent and comprehensive approach. 
The “compelling state interest” test was first put forth in Gray v. 
State.78 This test requires a state to justify any infringement upon a 
fundamental right as necessary in furtherance of a compelling state 
interest.79 Gray also found the right to privacy to encompass the right to 
ingest “food, beverages or other substances.”80 A version of this test was 
used in Ravin—albeit without mention of a fundamental right to smoke 
marijuana—to find that the state’s interest was not compelling enough, 
allowing for the personal use of marijuana under the privacy clause.81 
Secondly, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a “sliding scale” 
approach82 to assess the right to privacy in State v. Erickson.83 In an 
approach almost indistinguishable from the compelling state interest 
test, the sliding scale approach entails balancing the fundamental right 
to privacy infringed upon and the closeness of the relationship of the 
government action to the legitimate state interest served.84 The Alaska 
Supreme Court explicitly declined to use the same compelling state 
interest terminology and test that was used in Ravin, but continued to 
 
 77.  See John F. Grossbauer, Alaska’s Right to Privacy Ten Years After Ravin v. 
State: Developing a Jurisprudence of Privacy, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 159, 160 (1985) (“The 
court’s failure to develop an independent analytical approach to the privacy 
issue has resulted in inconsistent treatment of the right in the variety of contexts 
in which the amendment has been invoked.”). 
 78.  525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974). 
 79.  Id. at 527. 
 80.  Id. at 528. 
 81.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975). 
 82.  Grossbauer, supra note 77. 
 83.  574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978). 
 84.  See id. at 22 (“We find that there is a sufficiently close and substantial 
relationship between the means chosen to regulate cocaine and the legislative 
purpose of preventing harm to health and welfare so as to justify the prohibition 
of use of cocaine.”). 
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analyze the possible privacy infringement under a tailoring approach 
using different terminology.85 Despite the similarities of the compelling 
state interest test and the sliding scale approach,86 the sliding scale 
approach in Erickson allowed the government interest in public safety to 
outweigh the privacy interest in using cocaine in the home—in stark 
contrast to the outcome of the compelling state interest test analysis in 
Ravin.87 
Yet another approach to the Alaskan right to privacy, distinct in 
terminology and analysis from these first two tests, has been adopted as 
a reflection of the federal measures against unreasonable search and 
seizure—whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
at the time and place of the search.88 Another point of the privacy 
analysis in Martin, as well as in many search and seizure cases, is 
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time and 
place of the search.89 In his concurrence in Katz v. United States,90 Justice 
Harlan set forth the two-prong test for finding that there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.91 First, the person must have an 
actual subjective expectation of privacy; secondly, the expectation must 
be recognized as reasonable by society.92 After laying out the test, Justice 
Harlan specifically applied the two-prong approach to the home, finding 
that the home is typically a place where privacy is reasonably 
expected.93 The state of Alaska has explicitly and continuously adopted 
Justice Harlan’s articulation of this two-prong approach in assessing 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.94 
Alaska’s continual use of all three of these approaches has led to 
 
 85.  See id. at 11–12. 
 86.  Both tests are different versions of a tailoring test with different 
terminology denoting a similar analysis. The compelling state interest test 
requires necessity to meet a compelling state interest, while the sliding scale 
approach requires a closeness of the relationship to a legitimate state interest. 
This is another indication of the lack of structure in approaches to a right to 
privacy. 
 87.  Erickson, 574 P.2d at 18. 
 88.  See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 875 (Alaska 1978) (adopting the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 89.  Martin v. State, 297 P.3d 896, 899 (Alaska 2013). 
 90.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 91.  Id. at 361. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a 
place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention 
to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 94.  Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 797 (Alaska 1973). See, e.g., Anderson v. 
State, 555 P.2d 251, 260–61 (Alaska 1976); Nathanson v. State, 554 P.2d 456, 458 
(Alaska 1976); Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138, 149 (Alaska 1977). 
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scattered jurisprudence and seemingly case-by-case determination of 
whether or not the right to privacy protects an individual’s conduct. For 
instance, in Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,95 the Alaska Supreme 
Court found that although Ravin still allowed the personal use of 
marijuana to be covered by the right to privacy, employees “could not 
maintain an action for invasion of privacy with regard to . . . urinalysis” 
conducted by their employer that was designed to detect personal use of 
marijuana.96 The rationale for allowing the infringement on the 
employees’ right to privacy in Luedtke was in large part that the personal 
use of marijuana could endanger others because “work on an oil rig can 
be very dangerous.”97 Yet, in Sampson v. State,98 the Alaska Supreme 
Court held that the right to privacy did not allow for physician-assisted 
suicide of the terminally ill—despite the lack of evidence that the act 
involves any genuine harm to others.99 
One explanation for the current approach is that, while the 
decisions may seem chaotic, there is actually an underlying pattern. The 
phenomenon of “equilibrium-adjustment” has been proposed to explain 
similar case-by-case analysis in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.100 
The basic principle of equilibrium-adjustment is characterized as 
maintaining the status quo such that “[w]hen new tools and new 
practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant 
way, courts adjust the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try to 
restore the prior equilibrium.”101 However, several Fourth Amendment 
laws have remained relatively stable since their inception.102 This 
includes the rule that in order “[t]o search a home, the police ordinarily 
must have a warrant.”103 This theory can be triggered when there are 
“new crimes and new ways in which crimes are committed and 
investigated.”104 In Martin, the home manufacture of 
methamphetamines was a fairly new criminal act and social 
phenomenon. Methamphetamine was not invented until 1919 in Japan, 
 
 95.  768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989). 
 96.  Id. at 1138. 
 97.  See id. at 1136 (“It is extremely important that the driller be drug free in 
the performance of his tasks in order to insure the immediate safety of the other 
personnel on the particular drill rig.”). 
 98.  31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001). 
 99.  Id. at 98. 
 100.  See Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of The Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) (explaining equilibrium-adjustment 
theory in defense of a seemingly scattered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 101.  Id. at 480. 
 102.  Id. at 484–85. 
 103.  Id. at 484. 
 104.  Id. at 489. 
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and was not outlawed until 1970 by the Controlled Substances Act.105 
The current method of cooking methamphetamines at home did not 
appear until the 1990s, and the precursors that are sold in drugstores 
were not regulated until 1996.106 Under the equilibrium-adjustment 
theory, this new crime might cause the search and seizure analysis to 
adjust to account for the change. However, even if there is some element 
of subconscious order through the equilibrium-adjustment theory, 
driven in Martin by the relatively new crime of methamphetamine 
production, Alaska still needs to express the approach in a coherent 
manner so that it can be applied with clarity and regularity going 
forward. 
B. Consequences of the Current, Non-cohesive Approach in Martin 
Under the court’s reasoning in Martin, an officer could walk up to 
any house and peek through a narrow crack between curtains that have 
been deliberately drawn, just to see if they observe anything 
incriminating. The court claims that the officer “was not engaged in 
some random fishing expedition” because he had been tipped off that 
the men had purchased precursors used in the production of 
methamphetamine.107 But the record shows that Trooper Ingram 
actually walked up on the deck, up to the house, and looked in the 
window without knowing if the suspects had gone into that residence at all.108 
The officer stated that he lost sight of the suspects after driving past the 
entrance of the complex to maintain his undercover status. In doing so, 
“he did not see which of the five units the suspects entered.”109 Then he 
called for backup, and waited outside “hoping that one or more of the 
four suspects would emerge” from one of the five residences in the 
complex.110 At that point, the officers did not know which residence 
housed the suspects. This is apparent because of Trooper Ingram’s 
testimony that he walked up and “looked through the window of the 
first unit he came to.”111 Luckily for the state (and quite unluckily for the 
suspects) that first unit happened to be housing precursors to the 
controlled substances. However, the link in the inference chain the 
officers were working with had been broken before they peered into the 
 
 105.  A Brief History of Methamphetamine, VT. DEP’T OF HEALTH (2015), 
http://healthvermont.gov/adap/meth/brief_history.aspx. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Martin v. State, 297 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013). 
 108.  Id. at 897. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
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window. If the first unit had housed a different set of four men who 
were lining up cocaine to snort, could Trooper Ingram have entered 
based on what he saw through a crack in their window blinds? Though 
he was looking for a particular set of suspects, and even if we stipulate 
the debatable point that the walkway was impliedly public space, the 
Martin approach still allows an officer to look through a hole in anyone’s 
blinds, so long as they live near a followed suspect. 
Furthermore, instead of providing probable cause and obtaining a 
search warrant to search the residence, Trooper Ingram’s search itself, 
through the window, provided the probable cause that then allowed the 
officers to obtain a warrant and seize the evidence. Not only is this 
circular logic alarming, it also flies in the face of Alaska law. The Alaska 
Supreme Court has deliberately continued to use the two-prong Aguilar-
Spinelli test for probable cause.112 In 1983, the federal law became a two-
prong test that allowed probable cause to be a fluid concept, with one 
prong being able to make up for a lack of reliability in the other, so as 
not to impede police work in the field by giving de novo review to 
magistrate judges.113 However, the Alaska Supreme Court chose to keep 
the more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test because of the heightened right to 
privacy established under Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska 
Constitution.114 This bears on the analysis of the Martin decision in that 
the express right to privacy has been purposefully interpreted to 
heighten the burden on police investigations. There is far less weight 
given in Alaska to an argument that the practical impediments to 
obtaining evidence against suspects should allow the right to privacy to 
be infringed upon. 
Because the Alaska Supreme Court employs these tests 
intermittently and in different fact-specific scenarios, the practical effect 
is a type of ex post, case-by-case analysis of an individual’s right to 
privacy when it is competing with an action in furtherance of a state 
interest. Therefore, there is little predictability as to what is considered 
protected by a right to privacy and what is not. The facts of Martin 
demonstrate the necessity of a coherent approach to the right to privacy 
in Alaska. 
 
 112.  See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322 (Alaska 1985) (maintaining a more 
stringent approach for probable cause found by a magistrate after the Supreme 
Court of the United States adopted a totality of the circumstances approach to 
establishing probable cause). 
 113.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232–36 (1983) (adopting a less stringent 
test for determining probable cause for search warrants and citing, among other 
things, consideration for hindrance of police investigations). 
 114.  Jones, 706 P.2d at 321–22. 
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IV. POTENTIAL APPROACHES 
Though the Alaska Supreme Court somewhat dodged the question 
of whether the search invaded the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
Martin, Alaska needs to adopt a more comprehensive approach to 
balancing the privacy interests of individuals with the government’s 
interest in public safety. This Section lists several different approaches 
employed by others states through both their common law decisions 
and legislative enactments. It is important to remember that, in addition 
to decisions by the Alaska Supreme Court, the “legislative body is well 
situated . . . to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive 
way.”115 Whether through the legislature or the court system, Alaska 
must choose an approach to the balance between privacy and protection 
that honors both the Alaska Constitution’s express guarantees of privacy 
as well as the growing dangers to public safety. 
A. Developing an Independent Right to Privacy Jurisprudence 
Not all states that have separate codification of a right to privacy or 
a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in their state 
constitutions have taken on the challenge of developing their own body 
of privacy law. Some states have instead decided to use a “lockstep” 
approach—keeping the privacy rights guaranteed by their state 
constitution in deliberate congruence with the case law of the Supreme 
Court of the United States surrounding the Fourth Amendment.116 Other 
states’ high courts have embraced their chance to interpret the state’s 
constitutional provisions independent of any Supreme Court precedent 
on similar issues—and they often feel the need to express their reasons 
for doing so. The Supreme Court of Iowa did just this in their decision 
State v. Ochoa.117 In fact, over half of the state supreme courts have 
recognized heightened protections of their citizens’ rights of freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures under their own state 
constitutions rather than under the Fourth Amendment.118 As discussed 
 
 115.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 116.  See People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 46 (Ill. 2006) (holding that “the 
search and seizure clause [in the state constitution] “as construed under our 
limited lockstep approach, strikes the proper balance between protecting the 
people from unreasonable intrusion by the state and providing the people with 
effective law enforcement”). 
 117.  See 792 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010) (“Although many state 
constitutions have search and seizure language that is virtually identical to the 
Fourth Amendment, the movement toward independent state constitutional 
adjudication has had dramatic impact on the law of search and seizure.”). 
 118.  See Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MISS. 
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in Section III, the Alaska Supreme Court has affirmatively taken on the 
task of developing an independent approach to analyzing the protection 
of rights afforded its citizens under the Alaska Constitution, although it 
has yet to nail down a comprehensive approach.119 
B. Limiting the Scope of Places Protected 
Some states have struck the balance between the government’s 
interest in public safety and the individual right to privacy by limiting 
the scope of places where a reasonable expectation of privacy can exist. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois has interpreted the state constitutional 
right to privacy to protect a physical “zone of privacy.”120 The lower 
standard of reasonableness of the state’s intrusion is counterbalanced by 
the physical zone inside which the individual’s right is protected.  This 
approach not only uses physical places to limit the scope of where a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, but also can be limited by 
which tools are used to convey private information. The Supreme Court 
of Montana adopted a version of this approach in State v. Allen.121 Other 
states have specifically rejected the physical limitations approach to the 
right to privacy analysis. For instance, in Hamberger v. Eastman,122 the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that the actions forbidden due 
to a right to privacy are “not limited to a physical invasion of his home 
or his room or his quarters,” but also extend to wiretapping and 
eavesdropping depending on the content of the conversation.123 
The Alaska Supreme Court has not used the physical limitations 
approach as an effective tool to balance privacy and public safety 
interests. Still, the court has identified some physical limitations of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. For instance, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
where a suspect was voluntarily inside a police station, despite the fact 
that the note in question was partially hidden on the suspect’s person 
when seized.124 
 
L. J. 417, 418–64 (2007) (stating the test that each state uses). 
 119.  See supra, Section III. 
 120.  See Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 329–30 (Ill. 2006) (applying the Illinois 
approach that “the state’s intrusion into the individual’s bodily zone of privacy 
must be reasonable”). 
 121.  See 241 P.3d 1045, 1061 (Mont. 2010) (holding that conversations held 
over an individual’s cell phone will be recognized as areas in which a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists, even when that conversation is recorded “at the 
behest of law enforcement”). 
 122.  206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964). 
 123.  Id. at 241–42. 
 124.  Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502, 505–06 (Alaska 1967). 
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C. Adjusting the Burden of Proof Needed to Conduct a Search 
Several states have balanced privacy concerns with the state’s 
interest in public safety by adjusting the amount of suspicion needed for 
officers to conduct a search. Denoting a standard for the showing the 
government must make before conducting a search is one way that the 
state can balance individual privacy interests against public safety 
considerations. For instance, in Jardines v. State,125 the Florida Supreme 
Court held that the higher burden of probable cause, not merely 
reasonable suspicion, was required to allow a search at a private 
residence.126 This effectively allowed the state to search within a private 
area as long as a heightened burden of proof was met—creating a 
balance of privacy interests and public safety interests. 
The state of Alaska has not taken advantage of this mode of 
protection for the right to privacy either. In 2009, the Alaska Supreme 
Court held that a search based on an officer’s reasonable suspicion, with 
no probable cause, did not violate the individual’s right to privacy, nor 
did it constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Alaska 
Constitution.127 The court in Martin supported Trooper Ingram’s actions 
of looking inside the residence, through closed blinds, based on the fact 
that he “reasonably suspected that the group of people he had followed to 
the residence had just brought drug manufacturing supplies into one of 
the units.”128 The use of the evidence Trooper Ingram saw only by taking 
the action of looking through the window, based on reasonable 
suspicion, was key to establishing the probable cause that then allowed 
the officers on the scene to obtain a warrant.129 Setting the bar as low as 
reasonable suspicion for evidentiary support of Trooper Ingram’s initial 
search does little to balance privacy interests with the needs of a police 
investigation in Alaska. 
 
 125.  73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011) 
 126.  See id. at 37  (holding that “probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, is 
the proper evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the government must make 
under the Fourth Amendment prior to conducting a dog ‘sniff test’ at a private 
residence”). 
 127.  See Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328, 337 (Alaska 2009) (holding that an 
officer’s reasonable suspicion that the defendant was manufacturing 
methamphetamine outweighed the defendant’s privacy interests in his street 
side garbage). 
 128.  Martin v. State, 297 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013). 
 129.  See id. at 897 (“This search warrant, in turn, was based in large measure 
on the testimony of a state trooper who walked up to the residence, looked 
through a narrow opening in the window blinds, and observed a number of 
supplies that are commonly used for making methamphetamine.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Alaska must find a way to balance the competing privacy interests 
of its individual citizens and the public safety interests of the state. 
Unlike the current, unpredictable approach, the Alaska courts need to 
deal with this delicate balance without both restricting the scope of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and requiring only a showing of 
reasonable suspicion for an officer to effectively search a private 
residence from an impliedly public walkway. Instead, the Alaska 
Supreme Court should choose one limitation or the other to allow for 
searches and seizures in the interest of public safety, and without 
infringing upon the explicit fundamental rights to privacy guaranteed in 
the Alaska Constitution. 
The current scheme allowing for decisions like Martin v. State—
where an officer’s effective search inside an individual’s residence was 
allowed to serve as evidence for probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant and arrest the occupants of the residence—is not striking an 
adequate balance of the competing interests at stake. The Alaska 
Supreme Court went so far in Martin as to “concede that many 
reasonable people might find it distasteful to have police officers 
approach residential windows and peer through gaps in the curtains or 
blinds.”130 The adoption of a more comprehensive approach, one that 
hopefully yields results that reasonable people will not find as 
distasteful as that in Martin, will allow for stability in future decisions in 
Alaska privacy law jurisprudence as well as predictability in which 
actions will be protected under the right to privacy and why they may 
be protected. 
 
 
 130.  Id. at 899. 
